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A KANTIAN THEODICY 
David McKenzie. 
Since the publication of J. L. Mackie's "Evil and Omnipotence" in 1955 and 
especially since the publication of Alvin Plantinga's God, Freedom, and Evil in 
1974, much discussion of the problem of evil has been focused on the Free Will 
Defense as a possible solution. Furthermore, the discussion has been oriented to 
what is sometimes called, 'the logical problem', namely, whether the statement 
that the omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God of theism exists is consis-
tent with the statementthat evil exists, and not so much to the 'evidential problem' , 
namely, whether, even if Plantinga and others are right and these two are ulti-
mately consistent, the extent of the evil in our world does not undermine the ra-
tional justifiability of belief in God. I And again the discussion has been devoted 
primarily to the significance of moral evil, as Plantinga uses the term, the evil 
which results from human choice, and not natural evil, the suffering which results 
from the powers of nature, such as devastation and death caused by tornadoes, hur-
ricanes, volcanic eruptions, etc. Within these perimeters, Plantinga has argued 
that on the assumptions that God exists and creates free individuals, then it is not 
possible for God to create a world in which there cannot be evil. It is always at least 
possible, if not necessary, that there will be evil, due simply to the fact that human 
beings have the capacity to choose to perform evil acts.2 
In this paper, I want to approach the problem from a different perspective. I shall 
work not with the Free Will Defense but with the classical theodicies of Leibniz 
and Tennant, one based on the idea of the best possible world and the other based 
on the idea of the prerequisites for a moral order. I shall deal not with the logical 
but with the evidential problem. And the focus of concern will not be moral evil but 
natural evil. And further, by the term 'natural evil', I would like to stipulate all 
pain or suffering incurred by human beings except that which is self-inflicted. So 
understood, the pain or suffering experienced by any particular individual might 
be the result of natural forces or the result of the evil acts of other human beings. 
And still further, I would like to bring into play the idea of an afterlife, a notion that 
is often paramount in the lives of religious believers but seldom receives much 
philosophical attention, even in theodicies. 
In explanation of my interests, it seems to me that even if the logical problem is 
solved, the experiential and human problem, the evidential problem, remains, and 
that it is this which has traditionally been the occasion both for the origin of faith 
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and for the loss of faith. And in addition, I doubt that preoccupation with moral evil 
even allows for discussion of the problem which actually motivated the writing of 
Job, the work of Hume, the great literary descriptions of suffering, and the class-
ical theodicies. That question was, and is, recall, 'Why do the righteous suffer?' 
not 'Why are human beings immoral?' It spoke to the injustice of things which 
happen to a person in a world created by a just and loving God, not of things which 
a person does in such a world. I hope to recapture this original motivation in re-
structuring the issue. 
There is a good reason to believe that Hume himself was thinking primarily of 
the evidential issue in his classic statement of the problem in the Dialogues. 
Philo's famous statement of the logical issue, 
Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance surely. From 
some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? But he is perfectly 
benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing 
can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive. 3 
is couched in a lengthy discussion of classes and specific examples of the misery 
experienced by the human race. It was not the inconsistency of evil and God's exis-
tence which was the primary issue for Philo, but the impossibility of deriving any-
thing like the traditional attributes of God as cause from empirical experience of 
the universe as effect, given the enormity of the misery therein. Philo makes this 
point clear in continuing, 
I will allow, that pain or misery in man is compatible with infinite power 
and goodness in the Deity .... A mere possible compatibility is not suffi-
cient. You must prove these pure, unmixt, and uncontrollable attributes 
from these mixed and confused phenomena, and from these alone. A 
hopeful under-taking! Were the phenomena ever so pure and unmixt, yet 
being finite, they would be insufficient for that purpose. How much 
more, where they are also so jarring and discordant!' 
These comments reflect a concern for the evidence, not the logic of the issue. 
Hume is worried about the nature of the actual suffering, its variety and extent. 
That also remains an appropriate interest for us. 
Having clarified the nature of the problem as I wish to consider it, I want now to 
show that classical theodicists, regardless of the particulars of their work, gener-
ally provide a utilitarian justification of divine goodness in the light of human suf-
fering. Theodicies, of course, are as numerous as historical philosophers. Two of 
the clearest and most convincing, however, are the theodicies of Leibniz and Ten-
nant. Each in the strictures of his own cultural context and philosophical method il-
lustrates well the point I wish to make. 
Leibniz's theodicy says essentially that given the perfection of God, it follows 
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directly that he chose for creation the best of all possible worlds, i.e., this world, 
with all of its evil. The idea that a world of mixed values is the best world is itself 
grounded in his distinction between possibility and compossibility. Leibniz al-
lowed that in some ideal sense a perfect world would contain no suffering, and 
even that the various ingredients in such a world are all individually possible, but 
he argued that such ingredients are not mutually possible, or compossible in any 
actual world. Given the inter-connectedness of everything that happens in the life 
of a monad, and the prearranged harmony which must be assumed to account for 
the perceived order and relationality in the universe, any change whatever in the 
actual constitution of the universe would cause changes throughout. It would be, 
then, impossible to remove some or all of the evil in the universe and preserve at 
the same time its specific goods, or more generally, its essence as this particular 
world. 
A passage from his Theodicy is instructive in this regard: 
Some adversary ... will perchance answer the conclusion by a counterar-
gument, saying that the world could have been without sin and without 
sufferings; but I deny that then it would have been better. For it must be 
known that all things are connected in each one of the possible worlds .... 
Thus, if the smallest evil that comes to pass in this world were missing in 
it, it would no longer be this world; which, with nothing omitted and all 
allowance made, was found the best by the Creator who chose it. 5 
What the best possible world theory implies, however, regarding the natural evil 
which befalls individuals is that such is a necessary condition for the world as it is, 
the best, chosen by God. Leibniz makes this relation clear in the following com-
ment: "The best plan is not always that which seeks to avoid evil, since it may hap-
pen that the evil is accompanied by a greater good."6 He then gives his famous 
example of the general who takes certain losses in order to win a great victory. In 
this illustration the evil that is experienced by the soldier is presumably justified as 
a means for the end of victory in battle. And extrapolating from the example, the 
suffering of any individual is a means for the end ofthe existence ofthis world, and 
is presumably justified as such. 
In a very different setting, Tennant provides a theodicy which is equ~lly utilita-
rian. In Philosophical Theology, he argues that natural evil is an implicate of the 
existence of a moral order. For there to be such an order, the argument goes, it is 
absolutely essential that there also be a physical order exhibiting lawlike regular-
ity. And if there is a physical order, then individuals who are at the wrong place at 
the wrong time, so to speak, will suffer the consequences. It is conceivable that 
God might intervene on each and every occasion when humans are in danger as a 
result of the forces of nature, but Tennant argues that such divine over-riding of 
natural conditions would eventuate in a chaotic existence, and would undermine 
A KANT/AN THEODICY 239 
the predictability that must characterize a universe with moral values. 7 
To be sure, Tennant criticizes certain utilitarian approaches, those theodicies, 
for instance, which attempt to show that particular evils are never greater than the 
particular goods they bring into existence. Given the "chaotic distribution of 
human ills," such a task, he says, is easily seen to be impossible. Furthermore, itis 
inappropriate, in his view, to think of particular instances of suffering as willed by 
God as means for other ends. To suppose, for example, that one person's suffering 
is willed as a means for the spiritual edification of another is to conceive of God as 
"immoral." Yet, there is a larger sense in which the means-end scheme is surely at 
work in this theodicy also. The evils Of nature, Tennant allows, are "collateral ef-
fects of what, in itself or as a whole, is good (nature) because instrumental to the 
highest good (the moral order)."8 Or again, 
They are rather inevitable, if incidental, accompaniments or by-products 
of the world-order which, as a whole, and by means of its uniformity, is 
a pre-requisite of the actualization of the highest good we can conceive 
the world as embodying.9 
But what this really comes to, though Tennant does not put it in these words, is that 
particular instances of suffering are necessary conditions for the moral order, or, in 
other words, means to the end of the moral order. 
In both the best possible world of Leibniz and the moral order of Tennant, then, 
the suffering of certain individuals is finally justified as a requirement for the larger 
system in which they exist. Both theodicies are able to show why suffering is 
necessary in a theistic world, abstractly considered. But both picture the divine 
governance of the worl.d in a remarkably utilitarian fashion, and it is this feature 
which I now wish to call into question. 
Recall again the motivation for the question of suffering. Everyone knows that 
suffering is necessary for life, that we could hardly mature as human beings with-
out it. But what has puzzled philosophers and literary figures over the centuries is 
the question, 'Why do the righteous sufferT It seems unjust that some would have 
to suffer so disproportionately. Though the utilitarian account brings to theoretical 
expression our intuitions about suffering in general, I do not believe that it can han-
dle specific instances of suffering in the lives of certain individuals and groups. 
, Utiiitarian moral thought has been the target of persistent criticism throughout 
the last two decades. The most forceful analyses have occurred in the discussion of 
punishment, an area which has interesting parallels with the issue of natural evil. 
Numerous moral theorists have pointed out that utilitarian justifications for the in-
stitution of punishment are problematic, particularly because they seem to allow 
both for punishment of the innocent and disproportionate punishment of the 
guilty.10 Retributivists maintain that prior to any considerations of utility such as 
deterrent value, rehabilitative value, etc., the punishment must be just, i.e., in-
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flicted only on the guilty and proportionate to the gravity of the crime. 
The parallel between unjust punishment and unjust suffering should be obvious. 
The innocent who suffer are in a situation similar to that of the innocent who are 
punished. In both cases utilitarian justifications could be invoked. In an oppressive 
governmental setting, for instance, an individual who has done no wrong might be 
arrested, convicted, and punished with the belief that his or her punishment will 
serve as a deterrent to the crime of which he or she was accused. And in the world 
at large, a good person might meet an untimely and excruciatingly painful death 
because the best possible world or the moral order requires it. Surely in both cases 
the individual has a right to complain of injustice, regardless of the moral worth of 
the larger purposes served. And if a utilitarian rationale for punishement is defec-
tive because it allows for injustice, then a utilitarian rationale for evil is defective 
for the same reason. 
Two selections from the literature of suffering will be helpful in illustrating this 
point. One of these is found in The Brothers Karamazov, and is stated by Dos-
toevsky's character Ivan, who complains that the well-being of the whole is not 
worth the suffering of children. And the other is the work of Richard Rubenstein, 
who complains that after Auschwitz no theodicy is possible, that any effort to jus-
tify the slaughter of an ethnic group is absurd. 
In the poignant and powerful chapter entitled, "Rebellion," Dostoevsky's Ivan 
castigates the saintly Alyosha for tendering something like the justifications for 
evil developed above. Ivan describes the suffering of a little five-year-old girl who 
was hated and tortured by her parents: 
Can you understand why a little creature, who can't even understand 
what's done to her, should beat her little aching heart with her tiny fist in 
that vile place, in the dark and the cold, and weep her sanguine meek, un-
resentful tears to dear, kind God to protect her? Do you understand that 
infamy, my friend and my brother, my pious and humble novice? Do you 
understand why this rigmorole must be and is permitted? Without it, I am 
told, man could not have existed on earth, for he could not have known 
good and evil. Why should he know that diabolical good and evil when it 
cost so much? Why, the whole world of knowledge is not worth that 
child's prayer to 'dear, Kind God' . 11 
No one with any sensitivity to human anguish can be unmoved by Ivan's argu-
ment. There seems to be no answer, and all of our rational schemes appear trivial 
over against the pain of the child. 
Rubenstein has made the holocaust an unavoidable reality for theological reflec-
tion in our time. He maintains correctly that anyone who affirms belief in God 
today must do so in the face of the millions of Jews who died in the concentration 
camps. It is especially acute as a problem for those in the Judeo-Christian tradition 
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with its belief in a personal God who is related to his chosen people by convenant, 
and it is most acute for Jews themselves. 
I believe the greatest single challenge to modem Judaism arises out of the 
question of God and the death camps .... How can Jews believe in an om-
nipotent, beneficent God after Auschwitz? Traditional Jewish theology 
maintains that God is the ultimate, omnipotent actor in the historical 
drama. It has interpreted every major catastrophe in Jewish history as 
God's punishment of a sinful Israel. I fail to see how this position can be 
maintained without regarding Hitler and the SS as instruments of God's 
wilL ... To see any purpose in the death camps, the traditional believer is 
forced to regard the most demonic, anti-human explosion in all history as 
a meaningful expression of God's purpose. The idea is simply too 
obscene for me to accept. 12 
Again, discussions of the moral order, the best possible world, or any other larger 
framework in which to interpret suffering, lose their glow in the overwhelming 
presence of Rubenstein's chosen people at Auschwitz. Who can say that their suf-
fering, or the pain of Dostoevsky's children, is justifiable as a means to a greater 
end? 
In the light of the critique of utilitarian thought generally, and in the light of 
these forceful personal and ethnic analyses of suffering, it seems to me that the 
only theodicy which is feasible is one which requires that individual suffering be 
justified by reference not to a broader scheme but to an end for the individual him-
self or herself, thereby preventing the person from being treated, as Kant put it, as 
a mere means. And since suffering often culminates in death, the only way in 
which such a theodicy can be worked out is by putting the locus for an ultimate jus-
tification of God in the afterlife, a procedure followed already by many religious 
believers in the concrete experience of suffering. In this way, we can preserve the 
contribution of classical theodicies, that suffering is often a means to a greater end, 
and at the same time preserve individual worth by insisting that the individual 
never be sacrificed for the whole. 
If there is no afterlife, surely the atheist is right. Given the evil in the world, no 
rational individual could believe in God. But if there is an afterlife, it is open to the 
theodicist to argue that whatever inexplicable suffering remains, after all the other 
accounts have been given, will be addressed by God at that time. Again in Kantian 
terms, the afterlife is a transcendental idea. How the scales will be balanced, the 
compensation be given, the rectification of the injustices in this life be established, 
is beyond human thought altogether. We have only the images of judgment and re-
ward in the various concrete religious eschatologies. 
The idea of an afterlife plays a sort of marginal role in many discussions of evil, 
including those invoked in this paper. Dostoevsky, for instance, has Ivan flirt with 
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the concept as he appeals for a retribution "here on earth," one that he himself can 
see. He insists that the retribution include him, even if that implies his resurrection 
from the dead. It will be unfair if he is not present, he says, since he has suffered 
also. In his words, "Surely I haven't suffered, simply that I, my crimes and my suf-
ferings, may manure the soil of the future harmony for somebody else .. .I want to 
be there when everyone suddenly understands what it has all been for."13 But then 
he recalls the suffering of the children once more, and despairs of any ultimate un-
veiling of meaning. Rubenstein mentions the afterlife also, only to reject it as a 
route of escape available to our ancestors, but not to the modem world. 
We cannot accept such a solution and we would do well to recognize the 
disguised yet nonetheless strong criticism of God's government of this 
world implied in their fantasy of another world in which he would ulti-
mately do a better job. 14 
And on the other side Tennant also mentions the afterlife as a locus of ultimate re-
stitution but then discounts it, insisting that a theodicy be able to detect already in 
this life the "world-purpose of God" as a "reign oflove."15 
Though the afterlife is often an object of ridicule, it should be pointed out that in 
the actual human experiences of faith it has always been and continues to be of in-
estimable importance. The phenomenology of religion shows that in virtually all 
cultures the belief, whether it be described as immortality, resurrection, orreincar-
nation, has been central to faith, and furthermore it is often stated in such a way as 
to provide for a rectification of injustice in this life. The Resurrection of Christ, of 
course, is foundational for the Christian faith. Without it, as the Apostle Paul says, 
we have hoped in vain. It is for Paul and for Christians generally a model of our 
own ultimate futures. And the model depicts a "spiritual body," no longer "perish-
able" but now "imperishable," no longer living in "dishonor" but now in "glory" 
and no longer in "weakness" but now in "power" (I Cor. 15:42-43, RSV). The 
spiritual body rather obviously represents a reality no longer racked by the pain and 
suffering ofthis life, but existing in glorious triumph over such evils. 
Further, it is interesting to note also that in practical Christian experience suffer-
ing, even death, is not so much the source of disbelief as it is the source of belief. 
The prayer of faith beside a hospital bed, the comfort of the gospel at a time of de-
spair, the quiet tears of sorrow as the hymns of faith are sung at the funeral, and the 
widow's final triumph over death and sorrow, "I know he is with the Lord now," 
all attest to the role of faith right in the midst of suffering. The latter has been for 
some, indeed, the demise offaith, but it is for many others the origin of real faith. 
I know that philosophical questions are not settled by ad populum appeals, and 
that the truth in fact may be altogether different from popular belief. At the same 
time, however, rational appreciation of the phenomenology of religion, and more 
particularly of the role of religion in giving expression to the ideas that have unified 
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both individual and cultural worlds, dictates that the religious experience of hu-
manity be taken seriously. And as a phenomenon of religious experience, belief in 
the afterlife has been ubiquitous. 
Granted, the afterlife is meaningful for faith at a time of suffering, and granted 
that a theodicy requires an afterlife to respond to the charge that human existence is 
simply unfair, we must still ask in what sense belief in the afterlife is a credible be-
lief in the modem world. 
I would like to bring two considerations to bear on this question. First, there is a 
longstanding tradition in the faith/reason controversy, a tradition that was articu-
lated most persuasively by Maimonides and St. Thomas, in which reason is given 
not only a positive role but also a restrictive role in matters of faith. In accord with 
this view, reason can establish the basic truths of faith, including the existence of 
God, but at some particular point faith-claims are encountered which cannot be as-
sessed by reason. In regard to these transcendent claims of faith, reason can per-
form only the task of showing that they are not impossible (both in terms of logical 
and real possibility). The best example from the medieval context is belief in cre-
ation. Both Maimonides and St. Thomas attempted to show that creation is not im-
possible, that there is nothing either in logic or in nature to preclude it, though it 
cannot be established by reason. 16 
This approach, I think, can be applied to our issue as well. Surely it cannot be es-
tablished either on a logical or an empirical basis that there is an afterlife. But at the 
same time it cannot be established that there is not, or that an afterlife is impossi-
ble. An opponent might object that it flies in the face of all known evidence from 
the natural sciences. So far as we know empirically, the objection might continue, 
the human being simply dies, the body decomposes, and that is the end of it. No 
one could deny the point of such an objection. But it should be made clear that what 
is being considered a possibility is not that the natural world will yield an immortal 
soul or a resurrected body by itself, but that the natural world combined with the 
creative and redemptive activity of God would yield an afterlife existence. And it 
should also be made clear that the kind of reality which is depicted by an afterlife 
is such that evidence from nature as the latter is construed in modem science could 
not conceivably be determinative in answering the question whether or not it 
exists. On the basis ofthese reflections, I do not see, by any stretch of the imagina-
tion, how the afterlife could be denied as impossible. If there is no power transcen-
dent to nature, and if nature is fully determined by modem science, then there is no 
afterlife. If there is such a power, and if the real world transcends even the models 
of science, then the afterlife is not impossible. And if it is not impossible, then it 
represents an open option for belief. 
I suggest that the Christian belief in the Resurrection of Christ as the "first fruits" 
of the harvest to come might be assessed in a similar way. There is the traditional 
Christian evidence that Christ was raised, namely, the empty tomb and the re-
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surgence of faith among the disciples, not just a general faith in Christ but a con-
crete belief that he had been raised from the dead. Assessed on the basis of purely 
objective, critical-historical inquiry, the facts themselves would be seen as in-
teresting but not persuasive, the latter because of the general assumptions of such 
inquiry that miracles do not happen and the dead are not raised. Indeed, those as-
sumptions, as the contemporary theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg has pointed out, 
would in all likelihood eliminate the Resurrection as a possibility, regardless of the 
strength of the factual evidence on its behalf.!7 However, if one were to approach 
the same data with the presuppositions that God exists and has the power to raise 
from the dead, then the Resurrection becomes a legitimate possibility for belief. 
This argument leads to a second important consideration. An opponent might 
argue more specifically that the theist has no right to appeal to the afterlife in his or 
her response to the problem of evil, that it is illogical and violates the rules for ar-
gumentation because belief in the afterlife presupposes belief in God, which is just 
the issue. The opponent might accuse the theist at this point, in other words, of 
begging the question. 
Such an objection misses the point of the argument. It would be lethal if the 
theist were attempting to establish as his or her conclusion that God exists and were 
to use belief in the afterlife, which actually depends on belief in the existence of 
God, as the evidence. This, however, is not at all the structure of the present argu-
ment. In our case, the skeptic has originally attacked the theist's claim that God 
exists by recounting all the lurid facts involved in the problem of evil. In response, 
the theist is not attempting to prove that God exists, though he or she, of course, 
believes that. Rather, it is being argued only that the problem of evil does not un-
dermine the rational justifiability of belief in the existence of God. Since the after-
life is a part of the theistic position to begin with, then appeal to this aspect of the 
position as a way of handling objections to it is completely legitimate. In fact, this 
is what always occurs when a theory is defended. There is no circular argument, or 
begging the question, here. 
Moreover, for the skeptic to ask a theist to defend the existence of God in the 
face of evil without the afterlife is fundamentally unfair. It would be like asking a 
boxer to fight with one arm tied behind him, or like asking a modern physicist to 
explain all the interactions of phenomena by appeal only to the force of gravity, ig-
noring the other forces of modern physical theory. And to say that the theist's ap-
peal to an afterlife begs the question is like arguing that a physicist's appeal, say, to 
the electromagnetic force, in his or her explanation of the behavior of certain ob-
jects, begs the question whether the behavior can be explained scientifically be-
cause determination of what an electromagnetic force is presupposes an under-
standing of the bulk of modern physical theory. Since such a force is an aspect of 
the theory in question, appeal to it is altogether appropriate and in no way begs the 
question. The same goes for the theist's appeal to the afterlife. 
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I suggest, then, that belief in the afterlife is a credible belief on the assumption 
that God exists, and that appeal to the afterlife as a final locus of justification for 
God is an appropriate response to the challenge to faith in the problem of evil. 
The ideas which have been developed in this paper are similar to some ideas de-
veloped by Kant in a more technical form in the Critique of Practical Reason, and 
in conclusion I would like to spell out the parallel. As everyone knows, Kant ar-
gued that belief both in immortality and in God, though not defensible on a theoret-
ical or dogmatic basis, is required for moral rationality. He held that the latter en-
tails the recognition of the Highest Good as the ultimate result of moral action, that 
unless we believe that the Highest Good can be achieved, such action becomes ab-
surd. The Highest Good itself, in tum, is conceived in two different but related 
ways, each of which generates a postulate of practical reason. On the one side, it 
implies the perfectibility of the human will, something which is obviously not ac-
complished in the finite world of sense and requires therefore a continuation of 
existence beyond death, or immortality of the soul. And on the other side, the 
Highest Good implies that there is ultimately justice in the universe, that virtue and 
happiness will finally correspond. Again, such correspondence is rarely seen in the 
miserable conditions of human life as we know it, so there is required for this 
reason also a continuation of existence beyond death, and in addition there is re-
quired the existence of a reality transcendent to nature who can effectively bring 
virtue into accord with happiness, or God. The Highest Good as a possibility, 
therefore, implies both the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. 18 
Though the ultimate purpose of Kant's argument is different from the point of 
the argument in this paper, his worry over the relation of happiness and virtue, and 
especially his conviction that this relation must itself be connected with an after-
life, are directly relevant to our interests. In fact, though it is not ordinarily de-
scribed in this way, his postulates of practical reason can be construed as an effort 
to work out a theodicy of a strictly non-utilitarian fashion. The suffering of the in-
nocent, or in his way of thinking about it, the disproportion of virtue and happiness 
in our finite experience, is never conceived by Kant as a means to some further 
end, unless it is an end for the individual himself or herself. Rather, it is always 
seen as an injustice in this life which must be remedied in the next. I agree that no 
utilitarian consideration can justify the evil in this world. It is immoral to think that 
the individual's pain might be a means for the end of a moral order or a best possi-
ble world. Only an afterlife, in which the scales are balanced, can satisfy the de-
mand for justice. Given the presence of evil, then, either there is an afterlife or 
there is no God. 
In summary of my argument, I have attempted to show first that the most 
troublesome aspect of the problem of evil is not the logicalobut the evidential con-
cern, second that classical theodicies attempted to handle the evidential problem in 
a strictly utilitarian fashion, third that the theodices so generated are immoral and 
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fail to justify the suffering of the innocent, a point that becomes crystal clear when 
it is asked what end might justify the pain of Dostoevsky's children or Rubens-
tein's chosen people, and then last that a viable theodicy, one in which the locus of 
divine justification is in the afterlife, can be worked out since belief in the afterlife 
is a credible belief, given the assumption of God's existence. I have, in short, at-
tempted to state a Kantian theodicy. 19 
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